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RIGHTS WITHOUT A BASE: THE TROUBLING AMBIGUITY AT
THE HEART OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

STEPHEN A. SIMON*
ABSTRACT
It is not only the outcomes of rights controversies that matter, but also the
kinds of reasons that count as legitimate in constitutional debate. A question of
pivotal importance is whether rights are rooted in uniquely American sources,
such as the will of the people, or in universal sources reaching beyond the
unique context of American politics, such as the requirements of liberty and
human dignity. The question is even more fundamental than the debate over
originalism, because the views of the Framers might be considered
authoritative either because they embodied popular will or because they
reflected inherent truths about freedom. Since many scholars consider
universal arguments illegitimate, simply identifying their use in constitutional
interpretation often is treated as a conversation-ending accusation. But
universal arguments continue to figure in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
regardless, which makes studying their role essential. By examining not just
when but how the Justices have appealed to considerations transcending the
American context, this Article demonstrates a troubling ambiguity at the heart
of constitutional law. It matters a great deal whether rights are peculiarly
American or universal in character; this Article shows how the Court
undermines constitutional protections by fostering uncertainty over the basis of
cherished rights.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not only the outcomes of rights controversies that matter, but also the
kinds of reasons that count as legitimate in constitutional debate.1 A question
of pivotal importance is whether rights are rooted in uniquely American
sources, such as the will of the people, or in universal sources reaching beyond
the unique context of American politics, such as the requirements of liberty
and human dignity. The question is even more fundamental than the debate
over originalism, because the views of the Framers might be considered
authoritative either because they embody popular will or because they reflect
inherent truths about freedom. Since many scholars consider universal
arguments illegitimate,2 simply identifying their use in constitutional
interpretation may be treated as a conversation-ending accusation. But
universal arguments continue to figure in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
regardless,3 which makes studying their role essential. By examining not just
when but how the Justices have appealed to considerations transcending the
American context, this Article demonstrates a troubling ambiguity at the heart
of constitutional law.
As used here, “particular arguments” (or “non-universal arguments”) refers
to justifications that treat norms of decision as being generated by the choices
of specific people, as reflected, for example, in the Framers’ intentions, the
binding force of enactments, traditional American practices, and the
preferences and attitudes of the American people. By contrast, “universal
arguments” reach beyond the context of any specific political community. In
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, universal arguments principally have taken
the form of appeals to intrinsically valid principles that follow necessarily from
the meaning of certain concepts or highly general standards of evaluation, such

1. RONALD C. DEN OTTER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN AGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 2–3
(2009) (contending that judicial observers “must care more about the method than about the
outcome” in studying the reasons that courts offer to justify decisions).
2. See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, UCLA L.
REV. 639, 703 (2005) (referring to judicial reliance on “[m]odern varieties of the natural law
tradition” as “discredited”); see also STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF
REASON 93 (1998) (noting that “[i]n judicial discourse ‘natural law’ has been used more as an
epithet to assail decisions a judge dislikes than as a constructive or favored position, and the
political controversy surrounding the charge that Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had
endorsed a natural law philosophy suggests that this attitude of hostility has not substantially
softened.”).
3. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (where the majority reasoned that
liberty “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311, 321 (2002) (where the Court,
in holding that the execution of mentally retarded persons violated the Eighth Amendment,
asserted its prerogative to conduct an “independent evaluation” of whether a challenged practice
comported with the requirements of “the dignity of man”).
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as the requirements of freedom.4 If the concept of freedom has meaning and
implications that necessarily follow, then the resulting requirements do not
depend on the expressed preferences of any particular people. Even if the
Court’s immediate concern (and jurisdiction) is limited to the implications of
the cited standards within the United States, the justificatory argument is
universal in character. While the reference to universality easily evokes terms
like “natural law,” “natural rights,” or “natural justice,” the Justices more
commonly have used other formulations, with prominent examples including:
limitations on government flowing from “the nature of society and of
government”;5 rights following from the “very idea of a government,
republican in form”;6 requirements “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty”;7 “principles which are the basis of all free government”;8 or standards
for “determin[ing] whether a challenged punishment comports with human
dignity.”9
Judicial reliance on arguments that are unique to the American context are
pervasive and taken for granted in American law,10 which is not surprising
given that the judges are institutional actors empowered by, and operating
within, a particular community governed by its enacted laws. The question is
whether judges ever may rely on universal arguments in discerning the
meaning of constitutional rights. One major approach on the Court
(championed today, for example, by Justice Antonin Scalia) has rejected
universal reasoning entirely.11 A competing approach (advocated by Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and others) has defended the use of

4. E.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657–58 (1829).
5. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810).
6. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
8. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
9. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
10. Reliance on statutory enactments and common law traditions is so common and widely
accepted that it does not occasion controversy, and judges do not feel the need to cite sources in
support of the proposition that they are appropriate reference points in judicial decision-making.
The controversial question is not whether judges may rely on sources reflecting American
preferences, such as legislative acts and longstanding practices, but, rather, whether judges must
rely exclusively on such sources. For example, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3028–30 (2010), Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for a five-member majority relied heavily on
history and tradition in holding that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms applied against
the states. In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer did not challenge the appropriateness of Justice
Alito’s sources, but, rather, argued that they were not in themselves decisive. Id. at 3120 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that it was also appropriate, for example, to consider a
right’s importance according to its substantive content. Id. at 3123 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
McDonald is discussed further below. See infra Part II.A.
11. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
rights interpretations should be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions.”).
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universal arguments, but, as I show below, often has combined them with nonuniversal arguments in a confusing way that calls into question whether the
universal arguments really are doing any work.12 Regardless of one’s views on
the validity of universal arguments, this core ambiguity in the Court’s
jurisprudence is troubling for a legal system that depends on litigants engaging
the arguments driving changes in constitutional law.
The significance of universal arguments frequently is overlooked, because
they are associated with “natural law,”13 a term which carries baggage that is
unwelcome in constitutional discourse, including religious premises14 and the
prioritization of property rights.15 But universal arguments need not carry with
them the ideas associated with traditional conceptions of natural law. To avoid
the distorting effects of false associations, this Article zeroes in on the crux of
what makes universal arguments distinctive—the appeal to reasons that do not
depend on the unique context of American politics. The remainder of the
Article advances two main arguments: Part I argues that ambiguity in the
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the basis of rights is troubling in light of the
Court’s leading role in signaling to litigants and other legal actors the kinds of
reasons that count in constitutional interpretation; and Part II and the
12. For example, as discussed below, see infra Part II, in Lawrence, the majority reasoned
from the implications of liberty, while also citing statistics reflecting public attitudes, without
clarifying the interrelationship, if any, between these two fundamentally distinctive kinds of
sources. 539 U.S. at 570–71.
13. E.g., JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER, NATURAL LAW AND THE ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 2 (2012); HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS &
ANCHORING TRUTHS: THE TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 43 (2010); CHARLES GROVE
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in
the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 172 (1992).
14. Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 180 (2008) (“Most,
but not all, natural law theorists are theists. They believe that the moral order, like every other
order in human experience, is what it is because God creates and sustains it as such.”); see
generally CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1963).
15. The Founding generation believed that property rights were rooted in natural law,
MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 111 (1996), and the Constitution reflected an emphasis on
property rights. (For example, Article I, Section 10 prohibited governmental interference with
contracts. In addition, the Fifth Amendment prohibited seizure of private property without
compensation, and deprivation of property without due process.) The Supreme Court paid
attention principally to property until well into the twentieth century, often applying natural-law
reasoning in protecting property rights. HAINES, supra note 13, at 160–65. In the late 1930s,
however, the Court abandoned this line of jurisprudence and generally demoted property in its
hierarchy of rights. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). Natural law had been associated with the
prioritization of property, and judicial reliance on natural law to strike down legislative acts has
been seen as discredited since the Court shifted away from property and towards the protection of
other categories of rights.
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Conclusion show how this core ambiguity has been exacerbated in recent
decades by the Justices’ increasing tendency to mix universal and nonuniversal arguments in confusing ways.
I. THE CORE AMBIGUITY IN THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE
The Justices have relied on universal arguments since the Court’s first
constitutional decisions.16 Opposition to the use of universal arguments also
dates back to the Court’s earliest period.17 Justices arguing for exclusive
reliance on particular arguments have treated constitutional rights as reflections
of popular will, with interpretation guided principally by constitutional text,
the Framers’ intentions, and traditional understandings.18 Opponents of
universal arguments have contended that judges lack the authority to ground
decisions in universal reasoning (or “natural law,” as they more commonly
refer to it), which is too vague and speculative to guide interpretation.19 In their
view, purported reliance on universal arguments opens the door to the
illegitimate imposition of the Justices’ own subjective will on the nation.20 In
Calder v. Bull (1798), for example, Justice James Iredell, responding to
another Justice’s appeal to the “general principles of law and reason,”
denounced judicial reliance on principles of natural justice.21 Another
prominent proponent of an exclusively particular approach, Justice Hugo
Black, criticized the Court’s use of universal standards, such as “civilized
decency,” and the “fundamental liberty and justice,” which he referred to

16. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 453, 455–56 (1793), for example, Justice James
Wilson examined the controversy first by “principles of general jurisprudence,” and argued that
states, like individuals, were subject to basic principles of right, justice, and equality, while
Justice John Jay reasoned from the “obvious dictates of justice,” and argued that administering
justice “without respect of persons” formed part of “the promise which every free Government
makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and protection.” Id. at 472, 479.
17. In Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), for instance, where Justice John Jay reasoned
from the rights “which every free Government makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and
protection,” id. at 479, and Justice James Wilson relied on basic principles of right, justice, and
equality, id. at 455-56, Justices John Blair (concurring) and James Iredell (dissenting) looked only
to text, with Justice Blair saying the Constitution was “the only fountain from which I shall draw;
the only authority to which I shall appeal.” Id. at 430, 450.
18. Justice Hugo Black, for example, stressed the importance of hewing to the Constitution’s
commands, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J., concurring), rather than
allowing judicial will to displace the decisions of legislatures. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 95 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
19. E.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring).
20. E.g., Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 668–69 (1874) (Clifford, J., dissenting)
(arguing that judicial reliance on extra constitutional limitations in the form of “natural justice”
would “convert the government into a judicial despotism”).
21. Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).
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pejoratively as reliance on “natural law.”22 In a similar vein, Justice Scalia
repeatedly has asserted that rights interpretations should be “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition[s].”23 Opponents of universal arguments
most often have opposed evolutionary approaches to interpretation,24 which is
not surprising given the emphasis on specifically American enactments,
traditions, and practices. At times, however, most notably in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, they have allowed for shifts in rights
interpretations, provided that those changes were discerned according to
evolving popular sentiment as expressed through legislation.25
Since many Justices have disapproved of universal arguments altogether,
their criticism has focused on the wholesale unacceptability of such
arguments.26 Unlike the criticism by advocates of an exclusively particular
approach to interpretation, however, my objection is that the Justices who
defend universal arguments too often have used them in a manner that
undermines their distinctive contribution. If universal arguments serve a
beneficial role, it is because they provide a basis for interpretation that does not
reduce to political power. The Justices, however, often have combined
universal and non-universal arguments in ways that call into doubt whether the
former really are doing any work.27 That is, the Justices have employed
universal arguments in ways that produce confusion regarding the basis of
rights.
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) serves as an illustrative example. In September
1998, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner were arrested, held overnight,
and charged with violating a Texas law that made it illegal for two persons of
the same sex to engage in certain sexual acts.28 The police officer who made
the arrest had entered Lawrence’s apartment to investigate a report of a
domestic disturbance.29 The report turned out to be false, but the officer
claimed to have observed the men engaging in sexual acts in violation of the

22. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69, 70, 91 n.18 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
23. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 629 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
380–82 (1901) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
25. E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 628
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (opposing an evolutionary approach, but arguing that if one were to be
used, it should look exclusively to American practices).
26. In all of the cases discussed, the Justices opposing judicial reliance on natural rights
arguments did not simply focus on the implications of natural rights arguments for the case at
hand, but, rather, launched general attacks on what they considered the illegitimacy of such
arguments. See supra notes 3–12 and 15–25.
27. See infra Parts I and II.
28. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63.
29. Id.
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statute.30 The state proceedings resulted in a fine being imposed on Lawrence
and Garner, and the Texas courts upheld the punishment against the
defendants’ constitutional challenge.31
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion (joined by Justices Stephen
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens)32 held that
the Texas law deprived Lawrence and Garner of their liberty in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”33 Justice
Kennedy did not seek to show that his interpretation of liberty followed simply
from the text or intentions of the Amendment’s framers, but, rather, maintained
that the meaning of constitutional rights had to be understood as continuously
evolving.34 He stated that the Constitution allows “persons in every generation
[to] . . . invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom,”35 and
described the Court’s decision as recognizing an “emerging awareness” of the
rights at issue in the case.36 The opinion suggested more than one approach to
discerning the evolving meaning of rights. On the one hand, following a line of
jurisprudence associated most famously with Roe v. Wade (1973),37 Justice
Kennedy seemed to be making a universal argument, resting the opinion on the
implications of liberty. He asserted that liberty “presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.”38 This sphere of autonomy, Justice Kennedy found, included an
individual’s choice of partner in an intimate relationship.39 More specifically,
he wrote: “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct . . . the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice.”40
The opinion, however, also cited laws, practices, and commentary in the
United States and overseas. The justification for overturning Bowers v.

30. Id. at 563.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 562. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also voted with the majority but wrote a
concurring opinion arguing that she would have invalidated the Texas law as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, as the majority had reasoned. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 578-79; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578–79.
35. Id. at 579.
36. Id. at 572.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
39. Id. at 567.
40. Id.
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Hardwick (1986),41 handed down only seventeen years earlier, included
statistical information showing that between 1986 and 2003 the number of
states with laws like those at issue in Bowers and Lawrence had dropped from
twenty-five to thirteen.42 Even among the states that retained such laws, four
applied them only to acts between persons of the same sex, and there was “a
pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in
private.”43 Texas itself had not prosecuted in situations where the intimate acts
were private and consensual.44 Justice Kennedy noted that Bowers had been
criticized by commentators and that courts in five states had not followed
Bowers when interpreting the meaning of liberty under their own state
constitutions.45 Additionally, the American Law Institute in its 1955
promulgation of the Model Penal Code recommended against the adoption of
legal prohibitions on “consensual sexual relations conducted in private,” and a
number of states complied.46 Justice Kennedy also cited overseas sources,
observing that the British Parliament in the late 1960s had repealed laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct, and that the European Court of Human
Rights in 1981 had invalidated Northern Ireland’s laws criminalizing
homosexual acts.47 Other countries had “taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct.”48
Lawrence received a good deal of scholarly attention49 and renewed debate
on questions in constitutional theory, including whether constitutional rights
evolve,50 and the proper role, if any, of foreign law51 and traditional practices52
41. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42. Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 573.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 576.
46. Id. at 572.
47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73.
48. Id. at 576.
49. E.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63,
115–23 (2006); Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection
of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 414–17 (2006); Ronald J,
Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use,
Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
923, 927 (2006).
50. E.g., Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Decision
Making in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L. REV. 25 (2007);
Richard G. Wilkins & John Nielsen, The Question Raised by Lawrence: Marriage, the Supreme
Court and a Written Constitution, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1393 (2007).
51. E.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts
Morality’s Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1582 n.7 (2007); Steven G.
Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s
Practice of Relying On Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1398, 1412 (2006); William D.
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in interpretation. While these questions are important in their own right, they
are studied too often as discrete issues without adequate appreciation of their
interrelation with the more fundamental, underlying question regarding the
basis of rights. The problem with Justice Kennedy’s opinion was not that it
included unacceptable types of citations, but that it failed to clarify what role
the variety of sources cited were supposed to play in the analysis. Without
more, statistics on legislative trends and citations of foreign judicial opinions
do not provide a justification for an interpretive position; their relevance can be
assessed only when we know how they are supposed to fit into a justificatory
line of argument. Justice Kennedy’s opinion failed to establish a universal line
of justification, because the swirl of unexplained citations called into question
whether the universal arguments really were integral to the analysis after all.
The opinion also failed to establish a particular line of justification, because it
did not adequately explain how or why state or foreign practices were
supposed to impact the content of constitutional rights.53
Consider the citations of state practices; how did they fit into Justice
Kennedy’s argument? Perhaps Justice Kennedy was advancing a particular line
of argument, with trends in state practices demonstrating a shift in American
attitudes. If this is what Justice Kennedy intended, however, then we would
expect to see a greater marshaling of evidence regarding public attitudes at the
time of Bowers and Lawrence, or an argument explaining why trends in state
legislation were the most reliable indicator of public attitudes. On the other
hand, Justice Kennedy might have been advancing a universal line of
argument, with the increasing societal recognition of a right offered as
evidence of its indispensability to liberty. Justice Kennedy, however, did not
articulate that claim, which, in any event, would have been difficult to maintain
given the degree of continued dissensus on the question.54
With respect to Justice Kennedy’s foreign citations, we can envisage at
least two ways in which they might support a universal line of analysis. First,
foreign judicial opinions might offer persuasive arguments demonstrating why
the right at stake in Lawrence followed necessarily from a commitment to
liberty, but Justice Kennedy did not offer these arguments. Second, an

Araiza, Foreign and International Law in Constitutional Gay Rights Litigation: What Claims,
What Use, And Whose Law?, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 456 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi,
Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign
Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004).
52. E.g., Ronald Turner, Traditionalism, Majoritarian Morality, and the Homosexual
Sodomy Issue: The Journey From Bowers to Lawrence, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2004);
Krotoszynski, supra note 49, at 927, 1018.
53. Reliance on state and foreign practices, generally, is discussed at length below. See infra
Part II.D.
54. By Justice Kennedy’s own account, for example, thirteen states still had laws like those
at issue in Bowers and Lawrence. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
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overwhelming global consensus might be evidence of a right’s indispensability
to cherished freedoms, but Justice Kennedy did not articulate this view either.
Moreover, he did not show anything like a consensus on the issue before the
Court. Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the citations together reflected an
“emerging awareness” of the right at stake simply pushed the question back
one step,55 because we want to know how an increase in the recognition of a
right supports the claim that the right is protected by the Constitution.
Moreover, while gesturing towards both universal and particular arguments,
Justice Kennedy failed to explain their relationship. Did one line of argument
serve the other? Did each reinforce the other, or did they just happen to come
out the same way? If the two lines of argument were independent of one
another, which would prevail in the event that they cut in opposite directions?
The opinion did not begin to address these questions.
The sum effect of these deficiencies is an inability to discern the basis of
decision, which is troubling in light of the Court’s preeminent role as expositor
of constitutional rights. We cannot expect judicial opinions to have the
precision of a philosophical paper, and we should not be surprised if they
sidestep certain issues. The question of concern here, though, is not a nice
detail in reasoning, a discrete doctrinal issue, or a matter of peripheral interest;
it concerns what kinds of justifications underlie the interpretation of rights.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence was not an anomaly, but, rather,
stands as an example of one of the two major approaches on the Court; it is an
approach which allows for changes in constitutional meaning and approves of
judicial appeals to universal standards, such as the requirements of liberty56 or
human dignity,57 in discerning those changes. This interpretive school enjoys a
long lineage, including late nineteenth-century due process cases58 and the
second Justice John Marshall Harlan’s59 influential dissent60 in Poe v. Ullman
(1961).61 Justice Harlan’s opinion in Poe drew on the privacy that was “basic
to a free society” in arguing that the Court should have overturned

55. Id. at 572.
56. E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).
57. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
58. E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530–31 (1884); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 387 (1898).
59. The first Justice John Marshall Harlan served on the Court from 1877 until 1911. His
grandson, the second Justice John Marshall Harlan, served on the Court from 1955 until 1971.
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supreme
court.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2012).
60. The opinion had formative importance in the development of the right to privacy. See
Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
4, 85–87 (2003).
61. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

112

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:101

Connecticut’s contraception ban.62 Justice Harlan knew that many opposed this
kind of reasoning, because they believed that it allowed judges excessive
discretion. After noting that the Justices were engaged in a “rational process”
of “supplying . . . content” to the concept of liberty, he sought to head off a
foreseeable line of objection in stating that this process “has not been one
where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take
them.”63 His attempt to defend this proposition included references to history,
the Framers’ purposes, and public attitudes, and he suggested that
constitutional interpretation entailed the following:
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which [due process]
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing. A decision . . . which radically departs from it could not long
survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
64
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute . . . for judgment and restraint.

The opinion, though, did not indicate how the Justices were supposed to
identify the traditions worth preserving. Justice Harlan said that interpretation
involved drawing out the meaning of broad concepts, and he pointed to a
variety of factors, including traditions and public attitudes, but the opinion did
not explain how these factors figured in interpretation. The opinion did not
clarify whether evolving public attitudes directly brought changes in
constitutional meaning or were only relevant because prudence demanded that
the Justices not stray too far from them. It contained the same kind of
confusion that continues to characterize the Justices’ use of universal
arguments. Especially in recent decades, practitioners of the universal,
evolutionary approach advocated by Justice Harlan have used universal
arguments in a manner that is incomplete and hedged. It is incomplete because
the Justices’ references to universal standards too often are cursory, failing to
fill in the gaps leading from the citation of universal standards to the
conclusions in individual cases. It is hedged because the opinions fail to clarify
the relation between their universal and particular arguments, thus calling into
question whether the former are doing any independent work.
These difficulties in the Justices’ use of universal arguments are evident,
for example, in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.65 In one
prominent, recent decision, Atkins v. Virginia, a 5-4 majority suggested
reliance on universal arguments in asserting its prerogative to conduct an
“independent evaluation” of whether a challenged practice comported with the

62. Id. at 550–53.
63. Id. at 542.
64. Id. at 542–43.
65. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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“the dignity of man.”66 Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court, however, also
leaned heavily on recent shifts in public attitudes and state practices without
making clear how these considerations related to the requirements of dignity.67
Would the Court’s decision have come out the same way if the nation’s
“evolving standards of decency”68 did not cut in the same direction as the
Court’s own evaluation? If not, in what sense was the Court’s evaluation
independent? The majority did not say. Similarly, Roper v. Simmons
concentrated on trends in state and foreign practices without explaining their
relation to the requirements of dignity, thus leaving unclear how the particular
and universal lines of justification interacted.69 Though ambiguity regarding
the basis of constitutional rights is not new, as discussed in the next Part, it has
been exacerbated by an increasing tendency on the part of the Justices to rely
on arguments appealing to popular attitudes without preserving an independent
role for universal arguments.
II. DEVELOPMENTS EXACERBATING THE CONFUSION IN THE COURT’S
JURISPRUDENCE
While universal arguments are perhaps best known with respect to
opinions regarding property rights in the early nineteenth century70 and again
during the Lochner era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,71
they have played key roles in many other areas of jurisprudence, including
procedural due process, the question of whether the Constitution applies in
U.S. territories, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As discussed
below, however, in recent decades the Justices in each of these areas have
produced confusion by incorporating a greater stress on non-universal
considerations without adequately clarifying their relation with the universal
standards that they continue to reference.

66. 536 U.S. 304, 311, 321 (2002) (disallowing the execution of mentally retarded persons).
67. Id. at 314–16; see infra notes 353–68.
68. Id. at 321.
69. 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (disallowing the execution of juveniles); see infra notes
369–88.
70. E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
71. E.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The term “Lochner era” refers to a
period roughly between the late 1890s and the late 1930s when the Supreme Court used the right
to pursue a lawful calling and the liberty of contract, drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, to strike down certain governmental regulations pertaining to business and
economic matters. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE
AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
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Procedural Due Process

Although the first major decision on the meaning of due process,72 decided
under the Fifth Amendment, held that historical pedigree was a sufficient
condition for the constitutionality of a criminal procedure,73 the Court shortly
afterwards established an approach to the procedural branch of its due process
jurisprudence that relied on universal arguments in discerning the evolving
meaning of due process protections. Soon after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment, litigants argued that it constrained state criminal procedures, either
because Bill of Rights provisions applied or the Due Process Clause directly
imposed limitations.74 In the first challenges brought under the Amendment,
the Court suggested a move away from a purely historical approach by
inquiring into whether procedures comported with essential requirements of
due process.75
The Court explicitly adopted a universal, evolutionary approach in
Hurtado v. California, holding the grand jury requirement76 inapplicable in
states despite its historical roots, because allowing development of new
procedures was necessary to “progress or improvement.”77 In determining how
the meaning of rights could change, Hurtado centered analysis on universal
standards, appealing to the “rights in every free government beyond the control
of the state”,78 and stating that any procedure that “preserves these principles
of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.”79 Due process
served as a “bulwark[ ] . . . against arbitrary legislation,” and guaranteed “not

72. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 311, 321 (2001) (describing
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. as the Supreme Court’s first analysis of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
73. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855).
74. E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1884) (where the defendant argued
on appeal that his conviction on charges brought by a procedure other than by a grand jury
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
75. Kennard v. Louisiana, for example, upheld challenged procedures, because they satisfied
indispensable elements of due process, such as “the right to be heard . . . both in the court in
which the proceedings were originally instituted, and, upon . . . appeal.” 92 U.S. 480, 483 (1875).
Two years later, the Court found that due process was fulfilled where the parties challenging a tax
assessment had been provided a “fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of
proceeding applicable to such a case,” noting that the parties received personal service of notice,
an opportunity to object, and a full and fair hearing. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105–
06 (1877).
76. The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
78. Id. at 536–37 (quoting Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874)).
79. Id. at 537.
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particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to
life, liberty, and property.”80 Broad requirements followed from these universal
standards: legislation had to be general and “not a special rule for a particular
person or a particular case,” and a valid law “hears before it condemns, . . .
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”81 The omission
of a grand jury indictment did not violate these requirements.82
The Court applied and built on the Hurtado framework in the following
decades.83 In applying this framework, the Justices during this period often
cited predominant practices or popular beliefs (historical and contemporary)
while making clear that these citations served supporting roles within an
overarching analysis that was universal in character. In Twining v. New
Jersey,84 for example, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination85 did not apply against the states, notwithstanding its
long history of observance, declining to accept that “the procedure of the first
half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American
jurisprudence like a straight-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional
amendment.”86 In his opinion for the Court, Justice William Moody stated that
the central question was whether a right represented “a fundamental principle
of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government and is
the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government[.]”87 Justice Moody’s
use of history in applying that universal standard was notable; longstanding
observance was significant if based in a belief that the practice represented an
“unchangeable principle of universal justice,”88 but not if it merely had been
thought “just and useful.”89 Inclusion in the Bill of Rights was not decisive,
because the question was whether the right enjoyed “a sanctity above and
before constitutions themselves.”90 The opinion’s historical examination
included: pre-Constitutional America; “the great instruments in which we are
accustomed to look for the declaration of the fundamental rights”;91 and the

80. Id. at 532.
81. Id. at 535.
82. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
83. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937);
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); West v.
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899).
84. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
85. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 101, 114.
87. Id. at 106 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
88. Id. at 113.
89. Id. at 107.
90. Id. at 113.
91. Twining, 211 U.S. at 107.
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practices of individual states.92 Justice Moody also looked beyond American
law, observing that the “wisdom of the [privilege] has never been universally
assented to since the days of Bentham; many doubt it to-day . . . . It has no
place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of
the common law . . . .”93 Thus, the absence of uniformity in American and
foreign practices counted as evidence against the privilege’s status as a
fundamental right. The examination of practices reflected on the requirements
that followed from universal standards, as Justice Moody concluded that the
privilege had not been understood as embodying a fundamental principle that
was indispensable to the protection of liberty.94
The Court’s use of history within a universal framework also was
illustrated by Powell v. Alabama (1932), in which the Court for the first time
invalidated a state criminal procedure on Fourteenth Amendment grounds,95
overturning rape convictions because the defendants were denied the right to
counsel.96 The community was so racially hostile that the young black
defendants had to be accompanied by military guard, and the colloquy between
trial judge and appointed counsel revealed an appalling indifference regarding
the adequacy of the defense.97 The Court found the right to counsel essential to
a hearing because the “right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”98 Arbitrary denial of
the opportunity to retain counsel violated due process, since even welleducated defendants with a viable defense risked conviction without the
benefit of representation.99 Due to the defendants’ youth and lack of education,
and the severity of the charges, the Court concluded that the trial judge was
required not only to permit the defendants to retain counsel but also to ensure
the appointment of effective counsel if they could not afford it.100 In a capital
case with uneducated defendants in dire need of assistance, the right to
appointed counsel followed as “a logical corollary from the constitutional right
to be heard by counsel.”101 Justice George Sutherland’s majority opinion used

92. Id. at 108–10.
93. Id. at 113.
94. Id. at 110.
95. William G. Ross, The Constitutional Significance of the Scottsboro Cases, 28 CUMB. L.
REV. 591, 592 (1998). The rights the Court had declined to apply against the states included the
right to a jury trial in a civil case, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875), and the right to a
twelve-member jury trial in a criminal case. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595 (1900).
96. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71, 73 (1932).
97. Id. at 53–58.
98. Id. at 68–69.
99. Id. at 69.
100. Id. at 73.
101. Powell, 287 U.S. at 72.
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history as evidence of the right’s fundamental status.102 American law and
practice always had afforded defendants the right to aid of counsel, and the
federal government and every state required appointment of counsel for serious
crimes: “A rule adopted with such unanimous accord reflects, if it does not
establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the
present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to
the fundamental nature of that right.”103
Without viewing history as decisive, then, the Court during this period
found a role for it within a universal framework. Lack of uniformity in
historical and contemporary practice militated against a procedure’s inclusion
in due process; that reasonable people could disagree suggested a procedure
was not essential to fairness and justice.104 Thus, in Wolf v. Colorado (1949),
the Court held that the exclusionary rule105 did not bind the states despite its
applicability in the federal context.106 States were bound by the Fourth
Amendment’s core principle ensuring “the security of one’s privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police,” because it was “basic to a free society,” and
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”107 but this was not true of the
exclusionary rule. Justice Felix Frankfurter’s majority opinion observed that
prior to Weeks v. United States (1914),108 which applied the rule in the federal
context, only one state of twenty-seven had adopted the rule, and at the time of
Wolf a majority of the states (thirty-one of forty-eight) still rejected it.109
International practices also failed to support the rule.110 The investigation of
state and foreign practices demonstrated that reasonable people continued to
disagree, which cut against finding that the rule had risen to the level of a

102. Id. at 60–65.
103. Id. at 73.
104. Within an examination of whether uniform observance supported a finding of a right’s
fundamental status, even judicial opinions could count as evidence of the possibility for
reasonable disagreement on the essential nature of a right. In Kepner v. United States, for
example, the Court had held that the federal government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause by instigating a second trial of the same case on its own motion. 195 U.S. 100,
133–34 (1904). When the Court declined to apply the Kepner rule against the states in Palko, it
pointed to a dissenting opinion in Kepner as evidence that “right-minded men could reasonably
believe” that allowing retrial on the prosecution’s motion was not “repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
105. The exclusionary rule prohibits the prosecution from using evidence at trial that was
obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 506
(5th ed. 1979).
106. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
107. Id. at 27.
108. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
109. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29.
110. Id. at 30.
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fundamental right.111 The significant observation was not the trend towards
adoption of the rule, but that substantial disagreement remained.112
However, the Court in the early 1960s moved to a new approach, selective
incorporation,113 which placed a greater emphasis on non-universal
arguments.114 Selective incorporation did retain an overarching appeal to
universal standards; in determining whether a Bill of Rights provision applied
against states, the Justices still would inquire whether the right was
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial,”115 or “essential for preventing
miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all
defendants.”116 Thus, when the Court in Mapp v. Ohio for the first time applied

111. Id. at 28–29. See also Betts v. Brady, where the Court inquired whether the right to
counsel was “in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of
fairness,” and found guidance in the “common understanding of those who have lived under the
Anglo-American system of law.” 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942). As in Twining, the investigation of
practices asked how widely the right had been considered essential to fairness. Justice Owen
Roberts’s historical examination did not reveal a uniform view in favor of providing counsel to
all indigent defendants. Betts, 316 U.S. at 465–66. Common law required allowance of
representation but not appointment of counsel. Betts, 316 U.S. at 466. Some states, both in 1789
and 1949, provided counsel by statute but did not secure the right constitutionally. Betts, 316 U.S.
at 469–70. Dissensus on appointed counsel as a fundamental right supported a finding that it was
not required by due process. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471.
112. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting in his
discussion of Wolf that “the relevance of the disparity of views among the States . . . lies simply
in the fact that the judgment involved is a debatable one.”). It did not follow, however, that
common recognition of a right necessarily brought it within due process. Id. The rule prohibiting
prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, for example, did not apply against the
states despite its widespread observance. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54–58 (1947).
Thus, Adamson did not turn on the prevalence of practices but on the nature of the right at stake
and the application of universal standards to the circumstances of the case. Adamson, 332 U.S. at
54–58. Justice Stanley Reed’s plurality opinion reasoned that California’s policy did not deprive
the defendant of the right to be heard, because it did not provide for any presumptions as to facts
or guilt based on the failure to testify; it simply allowed the jury to draw inferences from
undisputed facts. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 58. It was fair for the prosecution to note that a defendant
chose not to contradict inculpatory evidence. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 56.
113. The first decision in which a majority adopted selective incorporation was Mapp. 367
U.S. 643. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2209 (2002).
114. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
115. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465).
116. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). It also should be noted that the Court
has retained an appeal to universal standards in procedural claims that appeal exclusively to the
concept of due process itself without involving provisions in the Bill of Rights. This is a
distinction that was, strictly speaking, irrelevant before the Court’s adoption of selective
incorporation. In such “free-standing” due process claims, as before selective incorporation, the
Court frames inquiry around overarching standards such as “avoidance of an unfair trial,” Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), or a “miscarriage of justice,” United States v. Bagley, 473
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the exclusionary rule against the states, it linked the rule with principles
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.117 In overruling Wolf v. Colorado,
which had declined to apply the rule against the states,118 Mapp did not reject
that case’s reliance on universal standards but its manner of applying them.119
Mapp found that the rule necessarily followed as an “essential part of the right
to privacy.”120 Similarly, when the Court overturned Betts in Gideon it stated
that the earlier decision had correctly asked whether the right of an indigent
criminal defendant to appointed counsel was “fundamental and essential to a
fair trial,” but had incorrectly answered that question in the negative.121
Under selective incorporation, however, the Court “increasingly looked to
the specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights] to determine whether a state
criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.”122 As applied, the new
approach placed so much weight on inclusion in the Bill of Rights that it
amounted to a heavy presumption in favor of incorporation. By 1969, the
Court applied almost every Bill of Rights provision against the states.123 The
very notion of listing which Bill of Rights provisions were incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contradicted the earlier
framework. Under the previous approach, a right might be fundamental to a
fair trial in one set of circumstances but not another; the unit of analysis was
the fairness of a specific trial. By contrast, the unit of analysis under selective
incorporation was a specific constitutional provision, not the entire

U.S. 667, 675 (1985); see Israel, supra note 72, at 311 (quoting Murray’s Lessee where the Court
first carefully analyzed the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause).
117. 367 U.S. 643, 655.
118. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
119. 367 U.S. at 656.
120. Id.
121. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (overturning Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942)); see also Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403 (“We hold today that the Sixth Amendment’s right
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made
obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–
18 (framing issue as “whether the right of an accused to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, guaranteed in federal trials by the Sixth Amendment, is so fundamental
and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
122. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 18);
see also Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (“In resolving conflicting claims concerning
the meaning of this spacious language [in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause], the
Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance.”).
123. The only rights in the first eight Amendments that have not been fully incorporated are
the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers, the Fifth Amendment’s grand
jury indictment requirement, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous jury verdict, the
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on excessive fines. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010).
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Amendment,124 and the inquiry concerned whether the right as a rule was
essential to fairness.125
The impact of this shift was magnified by another feature of selective
incorporation: once the Court incorporated a Bill of Rights provision, it
automatically applied it against the states in all existing rulings interpreting
that provision in the federal context. Mapp illustrated the implications of this
unitary approach. In Wolf, the Court had held that the core principle of the
Fourth Amendment fell within due process but that the states were not bound
by decisions interpreting the Amendment in the federal context.126 Selective
incorporation rejected this kind of differential application. Mapp noted that the
Court did not allow differential application of other rights applied against the
states via due process, such as free speech and press.127 Just like those other
rights, the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy was also “basic to a free
society” and, thus, called for protection at the state level to the same degree as
at the federal level.128 Under selective incorporation, once a provision was
incorporated, interpretations from the federal context came with it.129 The
Court refused to apply a “watered-down” version of the Bill of Rights against
the states because it “would be incongruous to have different standards
determine the validity of a claim . . . depending on whether the claim was
asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must [apply] .
. . in either a federal or a state proceeding . . . .”130
Together, these changes meant that the Court would not in each case have
to engage in an essentially universal analysis by inquiring into the fundamental
124. Compare Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (considering the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel),
with Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (considering that same Amendment’s right to confront witnesses).
125. Benton, 395 U.S. at 795.
126. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
127. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
128. Id. (quoting Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27). Similarly, Gideon noted that a wide range of Bill of
Rights protections had been held “equally protected against state invasion” due to their
“fundamental nature.” 372 U.S. at 341. Examples included the First Amendment’s freedoms of
speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances, the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition on seizure of private property without compensation, and the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 341–42; see also Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (applying the privilege against self-incrimination on the same terms in the
state and federal contexts, and noting that other Bill of Rights provisions, including the
“guarantees of the First Amendment,” had also been “enforced against the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against
federal encroachment”).
129. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10–11.
130. See id. But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (creating an exception by ruling
that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials but not in
state criminal trials); contra McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.14 (2010)
(finding that the Apodaca exception “was the result of an unusual division among the Justices, not
an endorsement of the two-track approach to incorporation”).
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fairness of a specific trial. Instead, once a specific Bill of Rights provision had
been applied against the states, the Court could approach each case as an
application of a textual provision that applied against the states via the Due
Process Clause. By the late 1960s, selective incorporation entailed an
additional modification to the earlier framework that further enhanced the new
framework’s emphasis on non-universal arguments. Selective incorporation
initially had inquired whether it was possible for any governmental system to
ensure justice without recognizing the right at issue.131 However, in Duncan v.
Louisiana, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with this way of framing the
question.132 Due process challenges did not occur in a vacuum, the Court
noted, but, rather, within the legal system of a specific state, with all its
particular institutions and practices.133 A procedure that was not indispensable
in the abstract nevertheless might be essential to liberty within an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty.134 It was true, for example, that “a
criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to
imagine.”135 The process “would make use of alternative guarantees and
protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English
and American systems.”136 Nonetheless, since no American states had
constructed such a process, the right to a jury trial remained essential to liberty
in the American context.137 Thus, the Court determined that the inquiry under
selective incorporation should not be whether the right at issue was
“fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined,”138
but whether it was “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”139 The
change had significant implications, because, as the Court noted recently,
“many of the rights that our Bill of Rights provides for persons accused of
criminal offenses are virtually unique to this country.”140 Thus, selective
incorporation meant that the Court’s approach to procedural due process would
retain an overarching universal framework, yet move in a direction that tended
to de-emphasize universal analysis in the adjudication of individual cases.
Indeed, as developed, the new approach placed so much stress in application
on non-universal considerations that it called into question whether the
analysis remained essentially universal in character.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Israel, supra note 72, at 383.
391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
Id.
Id. at 149; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010).
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The Court’s most recent major due process decision reflected both the
enhanced emphasis on particular arguments and the resulting confusion with
respect to the basis of interpretation. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the
Court held, 5-4, that the Second Amendment applied against the states.141 Most
of the decisions applying Bill of Rights provisions to the states were made in
selective incorporation’s first decade, but the Second Amendment’s
applicability had not been determined before McDonald.142 Although the
Amendment’s “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is not a right of
criminal procedure, Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion approached the
case through the lens of selective incorporation, stating, “Unless considerations
of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that
protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies
equally to the Federal Government and the States.”143 Justice Alito (joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and in part by Justice
Thomas)144 framed the analysis at the broadest level around whether the core
right at stake was fundamental, concluding that the right to keep and bear arms
for individual self-defense was a “basic right.”145 The relevant inquiry, though,
Justice Alito stressed, was whether the right was “fundamental to our scheme
of ordered liberty,”146 and whether it was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition” (emphasis in original).147 The analysis turned quickly
and decisively to considerations that were particular in character, as Justice
Alito determined that the right at stake had been “recognized by many legal
systems from ancient times to the present day.”148 His evidence included
English history from before the Revolution, colonial history, constitutional
ratification debates, early state constitutions, early legal commentary, and
subsequent American history.149 The investigation centered on what the
American people and their cultural forbears believed about the right at stake,
eschewing examination of the right’s intrinsic character and importance.
141. The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
142. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
143. Id. at 3050. The statement came in a portion of Justice Alito’s opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
(Justice Thomas joined other parts of Alito’s opinion but not the part containing this quotation.)
144. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of
American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges
and Immunities Clause.”).
145. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
146. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
147. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (emphasis in
original).
148. Id. at 3036.
149. Id. at 3036–42.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

RIGHTS WITHOUT A BASE

123

In dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Sonia Sotomayor) was willing to work within the selective incorporation
framework, but he criticized the majority for relying excessively on history.150
While Justice Breyer challenged the majority’s interpretation of history, he
argued more fundamentally that exclusive reliance on history was “both wrong
and dangerous” because “our society has historically made mistakes.”151
Justice Breyer made room for the Justices’ analysis of the right’s importance
based on its substantive content. He was interested in how the right at stake fit
in with “other or broader constitutional objective[s],” and whether any
“broader constitutional interest or principle supports legal treatment of th[e]
right as fundamental.”152 The analysis identified basic principles and asked
whether they implicated Second Amendment rights. More specifically, Justice
Breyer could discern no close interrelationship between Second Amendment
rights and “assur[ing] equal respect for individuals” or the protection of
politically marginalized minorities.153 Unlike rights protected by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, which had been found
applicable against the states, the “private self-defense right” at issue in
McDonald did “not significantly seek to protect individuals who might
otherwise suffer unfair or inhumane treatment at the hands of a majority.”154
Justice Breyer, however, did not rely exclusively on analysis of the nature
of the rights at stake. He also deemed it “essential to consider the recent
history” of the right at stake to determine if it “remained fundamental over
time.”155 Thus, he found exclusion of Second Amendment rights supported by
contemporary societal indicators, including the prevalence of state regulations
of firearms and the absence of a “popular consensus that the private selfdefense right . . . is fundamental.”156 The investigation demonstrated that
“every State regulates firearms extensively, and public opinion is sharply
divided on the appropriate level of regulation.”157 Although Justice Breyer
criticized the majority for relying exclusively on particular arguments, his
opinion produced confusion regarding the basis of his interpretive method, as
he employed particular arguments without explaining their interrelation with
his apparently universal arguments. That is, he included universal arguments
but weakened them by failing to explain how they related to the opinion’s
myriad citations. In sum, then, McDonald reflected the broader ambiguity in

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3123.
Id. at 3125, 3136.
Id. at 3125.
Id.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3123, 3134 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3124.
Id.
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the Court’s jurisprudence; one camp (in this instance, the majority)
marginalized universal analysis, while the dissenters undermined their own use
of universal arguments by failing to establish that they played a role that was
independent of popular opinion.
B.

The Constitution’s Applicability in Overseas Territories

Like due process, the issue of the Constitution’s applicability in U.S.
territories is another area in which the Court early on established an approach
that carved out a substantial role for universal analysis. Also, as in due process,
the Court’s jurisprudence in this doctrinal area would later engender confusion
by incorporating a greater stress on non-universal considerations without
adequately clarifying how these fundamentally distinct lines of reasoning
interacted with one another.
Article IV, Section 3 provides the only constitutional language that speaks
to the governance of U.S. territories, stating: “The Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.”158 It was established early on that Congress
had general sovereign powers to govern territories, but questions arose about
whether constitutional limitations applied in this context.159 The issue figured
prominently in political battles leading up to the Civil War, with pro-slavery
partisans arguing that the Constitution precluded congressional interference
with slavery in the territories, and slavery opponents advocating congressional
discretion over the matter.160 Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott v. Sanford (1857) adopted the former position.161 Although the Civil War
overturned or rendered irrelevant critical elements of Scott, questions persisted
regarding constitutional applicability in territories. Nineteenth-century cases
adjudicating constitutional claims in territories did not settle the issue, because
Congress typically enacted legislation providing for the Constitution’s
applicability. Consequently, when the Court enforced provisions in territories,
it was not clear if they would have applied in the absence of congressional
legislation.162
158. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
159. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 181–
82 (2002).
160. Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 824–25 (2005).
161. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
162. See, e.g., Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. 437 (1850) (decision invalidating legislation adopted
by the territory of Iowa eliminating jury trials for certain civil actions referred both to the Seventh
Amendment, which guarantees jury trials for civil suits, and to congressional legislation explicitly
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The issue took on new significance when the United States acquired
territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea in 1898 through the treaty
ending the Spanish-American War.163 The desirability of the American
acquisition of overseas territories became a subject of political contention, with
President William McKinley’s election in 1900 signaling substantial support
for expansion.164 The controversy was stoked by differing opinions on the
extent and import of cultural differences between the United States and the
new territories.165 The country had never before annexed faraway territories
with large nonwhite populations,166 and many viewed these populations as
incapable of operating according to American ideas and institutions.167 The
common assumption of American superiority could be used either to argue that
territories should be acquired without extending constitutional protections or
that expansion was infeasible.168 Political and legal considerations intersected
in the debate over whether constitutional provisions automatically extended to
residents of the territories.169 The question arose in a different form than it had
previously because it was not assumed that these territories would become
states.170
The Court confronted the question early in the twentieth century in a series
of decisions known as the Insular Cases.171 Although the earliest of these cases
principally concerned whether territories were to be treated as foreign

providing for jury trials in the territory); see also Am. Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466
(1897) (noting that it could be a matter of dispute whether the Seventh Amendment operated ex
propio vigore to invalidate a territorial statute upon which the action at issue relied). Similarly,
the import of decisions suggesting Congress was bound by the First Amendment, Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878), and the Eighth Amendment, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130, 136–37 (1878), in the Utah territory was muddied by organic acts explicitly extending these
protections. The Court, at times, did suggest that constitutional provisions applied of their own
force in territories, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 347 (1898), but at others noted that the
question was unresolved, e.g., Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897). See also Burnett, supra note 160, at
824–31 (“Nevertheless, the very act of statutory extension had raised doubts all along about
whether the Constitution applied of its own force in the territories . . . .”).
163. Edward C. Carter, III, The Extra-Territorial Reach of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination or Does the Privilege ‘Follow the Flag?’, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 317–18 (2001).
164. Burnett, supra note 160, at 805–06.
165. Cleveland, supra note 159, at 208–09.
166. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2526 (2005).
167. Cleveland, supra note 159, at 209.
168. Id.
169. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects,
11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 24–25 (1994); John P. Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise,
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 134 (1964).
170. Cleveland, supra note 159, at 209–10.
171. The term “Insular Cases” is commonly used to refer to a little over twenty decisions that
the Court handed down between 1901 through 1922, although the precise list of cases included
sometimes varies. Burnett, supra note 160, at 809.
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countries for purposes of constitutional and statutory provisions regarding
tariffs,172 they were seen as raising the question of whether the Constitution
“follow[ed] the flag.”173 Only a handful of the Insular Cases dealt with
individual rights issues, but they established a general approach that largely
remains in force.174
The immediate issue in the first of the Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidwell
(1901), was the constitutionality of tariffs on oranges from Puerto Rico.175 The
case presented the question of whether the Constitution applied of its own
force, because no congressional legislation made the entire Constitution
applicable in Puerto Rico.176 While a five-member majority upheld the tariff on
the grounds that Puerto Rico was not part of the United States, the opinions
offered a variety of approaches to the problem of constitutional applicability.177
Justice Henry Brown’s opinion announcing the Court’s decision asserted that
constitutional applicability principally fell within congressional discretion,
stressing the need for flexibility due to varying conditions in the territories.178
He found that Congress had not meant to extend the Constitution to Puerto
Rico.179 Yet Justice Brown suggested that certain constitutional rights,
“indispensable to a free government,” might apply of their own force.180 There
were, he wrote, “principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon
character which need no expression in constitutions or statutes to give them
effect or to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their
real interests.”181 These principles included due process, equal protection of the
laws, access to courts of justice, and the freedoms of religion, speech, and
press.182 Justice Brown distinguished these natural rights from:
artificial or remedial rights . . . peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence . . .
. [R]ights to citizenship, to suffrage . . . and to the particular methods of
procedure pointed out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon

172. Burnett, supra note 160, at 835.
173. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
853, 872–73, 872 n.103 (1990).
174. Burnett, supra note 160, at 835–36.
175. 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901). The tariffs were challenged as violations of Article 1, section
8, which provides that “all Duties, Imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
176. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
177. Id. at 244, 249.
178. Id. at 279–80, 282.
179. Id. at 279–80.
180. Id. at 282–83.
181. Downes, 182 U.S. at 280.
182. Id. at 282.
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jurisprudence, and some of which have already been held by the States to be
183
unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals.

Justice Brown’s categorization of natural versus artificial rights effectively
distinguished universally grounded rights from those with a basis that was
exclusively particular in character.
Concurring, Justice Edward White drew a distinction between
“incorporated” territories, which were an integral part of the United States, and
unincorporated territories, which were “merely appurtenant [to the United
States] as a possession.”184 In plainer language, incorporated territories seemed
to be those expected to become states.185 On Justice White’s approach, the
entire Constitution applied of its own force only in incorporated territories.186
Since Congress decided whether to incorporate, Justice White’s approach was
similar to Justice Brown’s in looking first to congressional intent.187 Justice
White’s opinion also was similar to Justice Brown’s in suggesting that a
special category of rights might apply of their own force regardless of
congressional intent, that is, even in territories Congress had not chosen to
incorporate. There might be, he wrote, “inherent, although unexpressed,
principles which are the basis of all free government which cannot be with
impunity transcended,” and “restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they
cannot be transgressed, although not expressed in so many words in the
Constitution.”188 Congress could not “destroy the liberties of the people of
Porto Rico by exercising in their regard powers against freedom and justice
which the Constitution has absolutely denied.”189
Hawaii v. Mankichi (1903) raised the question of whether specific Bill of
Rights provisions applied in the territories.190 The joint resolution of Congress
making Hawaii a U.S. territory in 1898 had stated that existing laws would
remain in force so long as they were not “contrary to the Constitution of the
United States.”191 Congress formally incorporated Hawaii into the United
183. Id. at 282–83.
184. Id. at 342 (White, J., concurring).
185. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (referring to an
unincorporated territory as “one not clearly destined for statehood . . . .”); see Jon M. Van Dyke,
The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands,
14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 459–60 (1992); Carter, supra note 163, at 320; Lawson, supra note 173,
at 873.
186. Downes, 182 U.S. at 293 (White, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 341–42.
188. Id. at 291.
189. Id. at 298.
190. 190 U.S. 197, 209 (1903) (determining whether citizens of the territory of Hawaii had
the right to a jury trial). The right to a jury trial is also provided for in Article III, section 2, which
states, in relevant part: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
191. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 209.
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States in June 1900 and made provisions for the use of grand and petit juries
requiring unanimous verdicts for conviction.192 Between annexation and
incorporation, the defendant was charged without a grand jury and convicted
of manslaughter by a 9–3 jury verdict.193 The question was whether the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury requirement and Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury
trial (which at that time mandated unanimous verdicts) applied during the
period before the congressional action in 1900.194 Again writing for the Court
in a 5–4 decision, Justice Brown conceded that the conviction would have been
invalid if the 1898 congressional language were interpreted literally,195 but
concluded that immediate imposition of all constitutional protections would
have been so impractical that Congress could not have intended it.196 Applying
the principle that only rights “fundamental in their nature” were applicable
regardless of legislation, Justice Brown concluded that the rights at stake in
Mankichi did not extend automatically, because they concerned “merely a
method of procedure” that experience had proven beneficial.197 Applying the
same approach he had in Downes, Justice White reasoned that since Hawaii
was unincorporated at the time of the trial, the question was whether the rights
at issue were fundamental.198 Justice White observed that the Court had taken a
similar tack in addressing which procedural protections applied against the
states via due process.199 The Court in those cases inquired whether rights
necessarily were protected “in every free government,”200 such that their denial
would “work a denial of fundamental rights.”201 In its due process
jurisprudence, the Court already had determined that the rights at issue in
Mankichi were not fundamental,202 and Justice White considered these
precedents binding in the territorial context as well.203
Dorr v. United States (1904) raised anew the applicability of the right to a
criminal jury trial in a newly acquired territory, this time the Philippines.204
The defendant had been charged with criminal libel under territorial law,

192. Id. at 211.
193. Id. at 203, 234.
194. Id. at 211.
195. Id. at 209, 212.
196. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 215.
197. Id. at 218.
198. Id. at 221 (White, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 220.
200. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536–37 (1884).
201. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900).
202. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 218 (White, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 220 (“The mere annexation not having effected the incorporation of the islands into
the United States, it is not an open question that the provisions of the Constitution as to grand and
petit juries were not applicable to them.”).
204. 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904).
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which did not provide jury trials.205 A majority for the first time adopted
Justice White’s doctrine of incorporation206 and endorsed the position
developed by Justices Brown and White that a subset of constitutional rights
applied of their own force even in unincorporated territories.207 There were
“fundamental right[s] which go[] wherever the jurisdiction of the United States
extends.”208 Since Congress had not extended the right to a jury trial through
legislation, the outcome turned on whether the right to a jury trial was
fundamental.209 In addressing that question, Justice William Day cited the
universal formulations articulated by Justices Brown and White, and an 1890
case stating that congressional regulation of territories was subject to:
those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated
in the Constitution . . . but these limitations would exist . . . by inference and
the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives all its
210
powers, than by any express and direct application of its provisions.

Justice Day examined the character of the right at stake and found that it was
not fundamental.211 Drawing on essential requirements that the Court had
identified in its procedural due process jurisprudence, including a court with
jurisdiction and the opportunity to be heard in one’s own defense, Justice Day
concluded that it was possible for a legal system to preserve these elements
without providing jury trials, and the Philippines seemed to have such a system
in place.212 Consequently, the right to a jury trial did not automatically apply in
the territories.213
Later decisions confirmed Justice White’s incorporation doctrine.
Rassmussen v. United States (1905), for example, held the right to a jury trial
applicable in Alaska, because the territory was incorporated, 214 and Balzac v.
Porto Rico (1922) held that the jury trial provisions in Article III, and the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments, did not apply in Puerto Rico, an unincorporated
territory, because they were not fundamental.215 The Court treated it as a
general proposition, “clearly settled,” that jury trial rights “do not apply to

205. Id. at 143, 149.
206. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469 (1979); Carter, supra note 163, at 319.
207. Carter, supra note 163, at 319.
208. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 146 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890)).
211. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
212. Id. at 145–46.
213. Id. at 149.
214. 197 U.S. 516, 525–26 (1905).
215. 258 U.S. 298, 304, 313 (1922); see also Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98
(1914); Rights pertaining to jury trials, nevertheless, apply today to Puerto Rico by statute.
Aleinikoff, supra note 169, at 28.
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territory belonging to the United States which has not been incorporated into
the Union.”216 By contrast, the Court also indicated as a general proposition
that other “fundamental personal rights” did apply of their own force,
including “that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.”217
While the Court has maintained the outlines of the approach it adopted in
the Insular Cases, subsequent cases, however, have suggested a greater
emphasis on considerations of a non-universal character in determining the
applicability of rights in U.S. territories. The Court said little about the
Constitution in the territories immediately after the Insular Cases,218 but the
problems they addressed reemerged decades later. Reid v. Covert (1957) raised
the question of whether constitutional protections were available to dependents
of American military personnel tried overseas by U.S. military courts for
offenses allegedly committed outside the United States.219 The Court held that
American citizens were entitled to a jury trial even when tried in a foreign
country.220 Justice Black’s plurality opinion (joined by Justices William
Brennan, William Douglas, and Chief Justice Earl Warren) recognized that the
Insular Cases were inapposite but examined them as part of a broader look at
the Constitution’s applicability when the Government “acts outside the
continental United States.”221 Though the opinion distinguished the Insular
Cases rather than overruling them, Justice Black expressed disapproval with
their approach, stating that “neither [the Insular Cases] nor their reasoning
should be given any further expansion.”222 The notion that constitutional
protections could be considered “inoperative when they become inconvenient .
. . [was] a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the
benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our
Government.”223 Justice Black could “find no warrant, in logic or otherwise,
for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’
which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal
Government by the Constitution.”224 He contended that the government never

216. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304–05.
217. Id. at 312–13 The Court also implied that the First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and press applied of their own force, because they addressed a claim rooted in these rights,
although they did not find merit in the claim. Id. at 314.
218. Burnett, supra note 160, at 810–11.
219. 354 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1957).
220. Id. at 40–41.
221. Id. at 8.
222. Id. at 14.
223. Id. at 14.
224. Reid, 354 U.S. at 9.
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was free from the mandates of the Constitution, which was the source of
government power.225
In concurring opinions, Justices Frankfurter and the second John Marshall
Harlan each confirmed the continued validity of the Insular Cases, while
emphasizing that questions about constitutional applicability had to be
approached with an eye to the circumstances of each case.226 Justice
Frankfurter stressed the importance of the history, customs, and conditions
pertaining to each situation in which questions about the Constitution’s
applicability arose.227 Justice Harlan, too, argued that the Insular Cases called
for careful contextual analysis.228 The Court’s task was not to decide across the
board whether a specific right applied. Rather, the Court had to examine “the
particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives,”
along with considering whether application of the right in the circumstances
would be “impracticable and anomalous.”229
Unlike Reid, Torres v. Puerto Rico (1979) presented squarely the issue of
constitutional applicability in the territories.230 The question was whether
Puerto Rico, still an unincorporated territory,231 was bound by the Fourth
Amendment.232 Pursuant to Puerto Rican legislation authorizing police to
search the belongings of anyone entering the Commonwealth from the United
States, the defendant had been searched by officers at the airport despite the
absence of articulable grounds for suspicion.233 Although the Court
unanimously invalidated the search, the decision manifested disagreement
among the Justices regarding the proper approach to the issue. Chief Justice
Warren Burger’s opinion for a five-member majority indicated approval of the
Insular Cases.234 Like the majority in those cases, Chief Justice Burger
expressed concern that immediate imposition of the entire Constitution in all
territories “would create such severe practical difficulties under certain
circumstances as to prohibit the United States from exercising its constitutional
power to occupy and acquire new lands.”235 As a result, attempts to impose the
full Constitution might lead to injustice. In deciding whether the Fourth
Amendment’s protections extended to Puerto Rico, Chief Justice Burger’s

225. Id. at 5–6.
226. Id. at 52–54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
229. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
230. 442 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1979).
231. Other U.S. territories that remain “unincorporated” include American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Marianas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Van Dyke, supra note 185, at 449–50.
232. Torres, 442 U.S. at 470–71.
233. Id. at 467.
234. Id. at 468–69.
235. Id. at 469.
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analysis focused on local experience, inquiring whether imposition of the
rights at stake would compromise national interests or produce unfairness.236 In
conducting that inquiry, Chief Justice Burger placed great weight on the
determinations made by Congress and the people of Puerto Rico.237 Observing
that Congress had extended Fourth Amendment rights to Puerto Rico in the
period before the Commonwealth had its own constitutional system, the Chief
Justice wrote that a “legislative determination that a constitutional provision
practically and beneficially may be implemented in a territory is entitled to
great weight.”238 He also stressed that when Puerto Rico had the opportunity to
adopt its own constitution, it chose to include those rights as well.239 Rather
than analyzing the intrinsic character and importance of the right at stake, the
decision turned on whether application of the right was practical in the specific
context. Moreover, even in addressing that question, the majority deferred to
legislative judgments.
Although the Insular Cases remain good law,240 Torres showed that the
subject remained controversial. Concurring, Justice Brennan (joined by
Justices Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun) questioned
the continued vitality of the Insular Cases,241 and Justice Brennan (joined by
Justice Marshall) again expressed dissatisfaction with the Insular Cases in
Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States, citing Justice’s Black opinion in Reid for
the proposition that they were “limited to their facts long ago.”242 Dissenting in
Harris v. Rosario (where the majority upheld an Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program which provided lower reimbursements to Puerto
Rico against an equal protection challenge),243 Justice Marshall stated that “the
present validity of [the Insular Cases] is questionable.”244 Referring to Justice
Brennan’s concurrence in Torres, he added: “At least four Members of this
Court are of the view that all provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to Puerto
Rico.”245
236. Id. at 470.
237. Torres, 442 U.S. at 470.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Cases since Torres have cited the Insular Cases approvingly. E.g., Verdugo-Urquidez v.
United States, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (citing the Insular Cases broadly for the proposition that
“not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States
has sovereign power”); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255 (2008) (stating that the
Insular Cases “inform[ed]” the Court’s “analysis in the present matter”).
241. Torres, 442 U.S. at 475–76 (Brennan, J., concurring).
242. 494 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in the case held, 6-3, that Fourth
Amendment protections did not apply to the search of a Mexican citizen’s home in Mexico
despite the involvement of American drug enforcement agents. Id. at 274-75.
243. 446 U.S. 651, 651 (1980).
244. Id. at 653 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
245. Id. at 653–54.
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The Court’s limited post-Insular Cases jurisprudence has been
characterized by a greater emphasis on the circumstances of the specific
context. The Insular Cases had established a universal approach for
determining if rights applied in unincorporated territories; rights only applied
of their own force if they were “fundamental in their nature,” or represented
“inherent, although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free
government.”246 The rights that satisfied these standards were deemed to apply
in all territories regardless of congressional legislation.247 Using this
framework, the Court examined the character of rights regarding grand and
petit juries, and concluded that they did not qualify since they were not
indispensable to a fair system of justice.248 Although the Court nominally has
followed the Insular Cases, the post-Insular Cases touching on the issue have
not engaged the universal component of the approach that the Insular Cases
established. In a number of cases, the Court has held that rights applied to
Puerto Rico without explanation or analysis.249 In Torres, the Court did not
examine the intrinsic importance of the rights outlined in the Fourth
Amendment, but instead focused on enactments by Congress and Puerto Rico,
and the specific experience and history of the Commonwealth.250 Although not
itself involving U.S. territories, Boumediene v. Bush (2008) read the Insular
Cases as linking the application of constitutional rights with the evolving
conditions in a specific territory.251
The emphasis on specific circumstances in determining the applicability of
rights was a departure from the approach established by the Insular Cases. The
Insular Cases determined that Congress needed flexibility in deciding which
rights extended to newly acquired territories due to the varying
circumstances.252 In order to afford Congress the necessary flexibility, the
Insular Cases left a good deal of room for congressional discretion. While the

246. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. at 144–45, 147 (1903) (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi,190
U.S. 193, 218 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901)).
247. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147.
248. See Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 201.
249. E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668–69 n.5 (1974)
(due process); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 600–01 (1976) (equal protection). Curiously, in applying rights in Puerto Rico, the Court has
indicated that it need not determine whether these requirements applied via the Fourteenth
Amendment or a specific Bill of Rights provision. E.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 471
(1979) (“[W]e have no occasion to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to Puerto
Rico directly or by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
250. Torres, 442 U.S. at 471–74.
251. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2254–55 (2008). The case concerned the availability of certain
procedural protections to aliens detained as enemy combatants as Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 2240.
Justice Kennedy addressed the Insular Cases as part of a broader discussion of the Constitution’s
applicability outside the United States. Id. at 2254.
252. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 142–43.
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entire Constitution would apply in incorporated territories, it was up to
Congress to decide which territories to incorporate.253 The first step in the
Court’s analysis was to determine if Congress intended to extend constitutional
protections. Thus far, to be sure, the Insular Cases stressed the importance of
accommodating specific circumstances and the determinations made by
Congress. However, the approach also indicated that congressional discretion
was not limitless, because some rights were so important that they applied in
all territories regardless of legislation. The Court appealed to universal
standards as a frame for identifying the set of rights that did not vary according
to circumstance and congressional intent. Attention to circumstances and
universality worked hand in hand, because universal considerations set bounds
around the area within which legislative discretion would be allowed free rein.
However, the approach used by the Court in Torres undermined the role that
universal reasoning was supposed to play in this framework. Chief Justice
Burger’s opinion emphasized particular considerations not simply in
determining whether Congress had intended to extend the Fourth Amendment
to Puerto Rico, but even in determining whether it was one of the rights that
applied in the absence of legislation to that effect.
The role of universal arguments also is unclear in the opinions of those
Justices who have expressed dissatisfaction with the Insular Cases. Concurring
in Torres, Justice Brennan wrote: “Whatever the validity of the [Insular Cases]
in the particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases are
clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth
Amendment—or any other provision of the Bill of Rights—to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the 1970’s.”254 The short opinion could be
read in either of two ways. Advancing a non-universal line of justification,
Justice Brennan might have been advocating a “total incorporation” approach
for the territories, applying all Bill of Rights provisions by virtue of their
enactment. Alternatively, the opinion could be read as accepting the universal
framework of the Insular Cases and determining that all of the Bill of Rights
provisions qualified as essential to free government. The former argument
would represent a repudiation of the Insular Cases; such a significant departure
should be stated explicitly. The universal argument, if it is what Justice
Brennan intended, also calls for explanation, especially since the Court’s
incorporation jurisprudence never has held that all Bill of Rights provisions
enjoy protected status as fundamental rights.255 Without explanation of why the
rights apply of their own force in territories, opposition to the Insular Cases is
undermined.

253. See id. at 143; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
254. Torres, 442 U.S. at 475–76 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
255. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3125 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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C. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
No doctrinal area better captures the ambiguity at the heart of
constitutional law than the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting the Eighth
Amendment. Early Eighth Amendment cases could be interpreted as
incorporating citations of prevalent practices within an essentially universal
analysis. More recently, however, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been
characterized by a split between two competing approaches. One of these
approaches has rejected reliance on universal arguments entirely. A competing
approach has continued to insist on a role for universal analysis, but has called
into question the independent role of that analysis by training the bulk of its
attention on measuring fluctuations in public attitudes.
In its decisions interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,256
the Court early on introduced appeals to universal standards. In, for example,
In re Kemmler (which upheld the electric chair as a method of execution), the
Court stated that “cruel” implied “something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”257 In an influential
dissenting opinion in O’Neil v. Vermont, Justice Stephen Field used universal
arguments to support his view that a sentence of over $6,000 in fines for
illegally selling liquor violated the Clause.258 It was uncontroversial that the
Clause applied to torturous punishments, but Justice Field maintained that it
also prohibited disproportionate punishments.259 Cumulatively punishing the
defendant for hundreds of sales as separate offenses “was greatly beyond
anything required by any humane law for the offences.”260 Given the nature of
the offense, it was:
hard to believe that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from
shuddering . . . [T]he judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was
not only an unusual but a cruel one, and a cry of horror would rise from every
261
civilized and Christian community of the country against it.

256. Since the Court did not consistently view the Amendment as binding on states until the
late 1940s, see Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947), many decisions leave unclear
whether claims were rejected on the grounds of the Amendment’s inapplicability. Nevertheless,
some early opinions shed light on the Justices’ interpretation of the Amendment, especially in
cases brought against the federal government, where the Amendment clearly applied.
257. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
258. 144 U.S. 323, 338–39 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). The majority did not reach the
merits. Id. at 334–35. Regarding the opinion’s influence, see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 371 (1910), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
259. O’Neill, 144 U.S. at 339–40 (Field J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 340.
261. Id.
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Justice Field referred to existing practices in showing that the sentence was
inhumanely disproportionate, noting that it was far more severe than what the
defendant would have received for manslaughter, forgery, or perjury.262
The Court articulated an approach that was both universal and evolutionary
in its first decision invalidating a sentence prescribed by a legislature. The
defendant in Weems v. United States (1910) was convicted in the Philippines,
then a U.S. territory, under a statute criminalizing the use of false documents
by government officials.263 The statute provided a minimum sentence of twelve
years of hard labor while wearing chains, and a continuing loss of civil rights
after the prison term.264 Since the Constitution was intended to endure
indefinitely, the Court reasoned, its application had to expand beyond evils
known at the time of enactment.265 Constitutional provisions embodied general
principles whose application had to evolve with changing conditions;
otherwise, “[r]ights declared in words might be lost in reality.”266 To discern
the Clause’s evolving meaning, Justice Joseph McKenna’s majority opinion
drew on universal principles, resting the opinion on the “precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”267
Justice McKenna linked an evolutionary approach with both universal
standards and societal attitudes, stating that the Clause “may be . . .
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”268 The opinion
investigated practices to evaluate proportionality, considering laws from a
variety of jurisdictions in the United States and the Philippines, finding it
relevant that individuals convicted of more serious crimes had received less
severe sentences.269
Trop v. Dulles (1958) built on the approach the Court had outlined in
Weems, referring both to universal standards and existing practices in
interpreting the changing meaning of rights.270 Trop, a native-born American
citizen, was convicted by court-martial of wartime desertion while serving in
French Morocco during the Second World War.271 The 5-4 decision

262. Id. at 339.
263. 217 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1910). The Court interpreted the Clause because the case arose
under a territorial provision with similar language. Regarding Weems being the first decision
invalidating a legislatively prescribed statute, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
264. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364–65.
265. Id. at 373.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 367.
268. Id. at 378.
269. Weems, 217 U.S. at 380–81.
270. 356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958).
271. Id. at 87.
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invalidated a sentence depriving him of citizenship.272 Chief Justice Warren’s
opinion for the majority273 introduced a universal standard that has remained
central to the Court’s jurisprudence: “The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”274 The Amendment
imposed a “basic prohibition against inhuman treatment”275 and mandated that
the state’s “power to punish . . . [must] be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards.”276 Chief Justice Warren also reaffirmed an evolutionary
approach, noting that the Clause’s words “are not precise, . . .” and “their scope
is not static.”277 The Amendment, he wrote, “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”278
Citing a U.N. study showing that only two of eighty-four countries surveyed
prescribed denationalization as a punishment for desertion, he concluded that
statelessness was “a condition deplored in the international community of
democracies” and that there was “virtual unanimity” among the “civilized
nations of the world” that it should not be imposed.279 Chief Justice Warren
also engaged in his own consideration of the character of the punishment,
finding that it was cruel because it amounted to a “total destruction of the
individual’s status in organized society” and, thus, left an individual with no
rights.280 This condition, subjecting “the individual to a fate of ever-increasing
fear and distress,” was “a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for
it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development.”281 Though the dissenters interpreted the evidence of practices
differently, they accepted crucial elements of Chief Justice Warren’s
approach,282 including reliance on universal reasoning and international
practices. Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Clark, Burton, and Harlan)
spoke of the Clause as embodying “enlightened concepts of ‘humane
justice,’”283 and cited U.N. documents in his consideration of the practices of
“civilized nations.”284

272. Id. at 91.
273. The opinion was joined only by Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker. Id. at 87.
274. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
275. Id. at 100 n.32.
276. Id. at 100.
277. Id. at 100–01 (footnote omitted).
278. Id. at 101.
279. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 (citing Study of Statelessness, U.N. Doc. E/1112 (Aug. 1949)).
280. Id. at 101.
281. Id. at 101–02.
282. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 327 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that
the dissenters adopted the same basic analytical approach as the plurality).
283. Trop, 356 U.S. at 127 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 126.
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The Court’s earlier, major decisions on the Clause suggested that the
citation of governmental practices could play a supporting role with an
overarching universal analysis. Thus, universal standards required that
punishments be proportional, and surveys of punishments could help in
determining the proportionality of the punishment at issue.285 Likewise,
overwhelming consensus against a punishment’s acceptability could support a
judgment that the punishment was inhumane.286 More recently, however, the
Court’s jurisprudence has been characterized by an ongoing clash between two
competing approaches, with one approach repudiating universal arguments,
and a competing approach ostensibly defending universal arguments while
failing in practice to establish that they are integral to rights interpretation.
The most prominent debates in recent decades over the Clause’s meaning
have arisen in cases challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty,
beginning with Furman v. Georgia (1972), which invalidated death penalty
statutes on the grounds that they applied the punishment in an arbitrary
manner.287 Many states amended statutes in response to Furman, seeking to
address the Court’s concerns, and in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court
upheld legislation providing standards to be applied at a separate sentencing
trial following a guilty verdict.288 Since Furman and the cases on states’
attempts to meet its concerns, the Court has addressed a number of questions
concerning the constitutionality of death as punishment for certain classes of
crimes or defendants.
Five years after Furman, the Court held, 7-2, in Coker v. Georgia (1977)
that death was excessive punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman.289 In the opinion, Justice Byron White (joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stewart, and Stevens) stated that a punishment violated the Amendment not
only if it was barbaric, but also if it was “‘excessive’ in relation to the crime
committed.”290 Citing Gregg, White stated more specifically that a punishment
was excessive if it: “(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.”291 The disproportionality analysis included
contemporary societal values, and the question, specifically, was the public
acceptability of death as punishment for raping an adult.292

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910).
See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102–03.
408 U.S. at 239–40.
428 U.S. 153, 164–66 (1976).
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 592–97.
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The plurality in Gregg used practices in a notably distinctive manner.
Justice White’s opinion observed that a majority of states had not authorized
death as a punishment for rape in the fifty years before Coker.293 Moreover,
while sixteen states had authorized death for rape before Furman, only three
reinstated that penalty after Furman’s invalidation of all death penalty laws.294
With these figures as support, Justice White considered that state legislation
“weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable
penalty for raping an adult woman.”295 Thus, Justice White counted the
examination of state legislation against constitutionality notwithstanding a
substantial degree of dissensus. As noted above,296 the Court previously had
pointed to uniformity of practice as evidence that a right had a universal basis
and was protected. Conversely, the Court had counted absence of uniformity as
counting against a right’s protected status, viewing dissensus as a sign that
reasonable people could disagree.297 Here, Justice White viewed legislation as
weighing against constitutionality on an issue where public attitudes were
divided and in flux. While the opinion indicated that societal values analysis
was not decisive (since “the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear”),298Justice White’s analysis focused above
all on the accounting of state practices.
The majority used a similar line of reasoning in Enmund v. Florida (1982)
to hold death a disproportionate punishment for robbery where the defendant
did not intend or commit homicide.299 Again penning the Court’s opinion,
Justice White noted that of the thirty-six states with capital punishment only a
“small minority” of eight imposed death for this category of crime.300 In
another nine states, the sentencing body could impose death for the crime
depending on the circumstances.301 Together, only about a third of the states
authorized death for robbery without homicide.302 Additionally, of the eight
states that had enacted new death penalty statutes in the previous four years,
none had provided death for non-homicidal robbery.303 Justice White found
that the evidence “weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
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303.

Id. at 593.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
Id. at 596.
See supra Part II.A.
See id.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
Id. at 789, 792.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id.
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crime at issue.”304 Thus, the majority again counted legislation as supporting
unconstitutionality even where state practices were far from uniform.
The Court has employed a similar line of reasoning in cases addressing the
constitutionality of death as a punishment for certain classes of offenders. In
Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), for example, the Court held, 5-3, that death
could not be imposed on a person who was under sixteen years of age at the
time of the crime.305 In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court,
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) found
that the evidence supported an “unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of
the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the
conscience of the community.”306 Fourteen states had no death penalty, and
eighteen states with capital punishment had minimum ages of at least sixteen
years, while nineteen states did not establish a minimum age.307 Evidence
concerning jury verdicts was persuasive too, as it had been forty years since a
jury imposed death on a defendant under sixteen.308 In addition, Justice
Stevens referred to “the views that have been expressed by respected
professional organizations,”309 noting that the American Bar Association and
American Law Institute opposed execution of juveniles.310 Justice Stevens also
pointed to evidence from other countries. American opposition to execution of
juveniles was consistent with the views of “other nations that share our AngloAmerican heritage, and . . . the leading members of the Western European
community.”311 The United Kingdom and New Zealand, which retained the
death penalty for some crimes, did not allow the execution of juveniles.312 The
death penalty had been abolished in a number of Western European countries,
most of Australia, and (at least with regard to juveniles) the Soviet Union.313 In
his independent judicial assessment, Justice Stevens concluded that the death
penalty for persons under sixteen did not “measurably contribute[]” to
deterrence or retribution, stressing psychological differences between adults
and juveniles.314
For Justice Scalia (joined in dissent by Justice White and Chief Justice
Rehnquist), the crucial fact was that almost forty percent of the states,
including a majority of death penalty states, allowed imposition of death when

304.
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Enmund, 458 U.S. at 793.
487 U.S. 815, 817, 838 (1988).
Id. at 832.
Id. at 826, 829.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 830.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
Id.
Id. at 830–31.
Id.
Id. at 833, 836–37.
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juveniles were tried as adults, which could include persons under the age of
sixteen.315 If forty percent of states did not rule out the punishment, there was
no consensus against it. Justice Scalia rejected international sources, because
only American attitudes mattered. The practice was constitutional “even if that
position contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world. We must never
forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are
expounding.”316 Justice Scalia argued against independent judicial assessment
of the punishment’s appropriateness. Only original understanding of the Clause
and evolving American standards of decency could support a finding of
unconstitutionality.317 Justice Stevens had not addressed original
understanding, and his consideration of international sources opened the door
to subjective judging.318
While Thompson held death could not be imposed on persons under
sixteen, Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) upheld capital punishment for persons
sixteen or older.319 Justice Scalia’s opinion for a four-person plurality (joined
by Justices Kennedy and White and Chief Justice Rehnquist) again stressed
that the relevant standard was American attitudes, with legislation as the most
significant evidence.320 Of thirty-seven death penalty states, twenty-two
allowed execution of sixteen-year-olds, and twenty-five allowed execution of
seventeen-year-olds.321 This data did “not establish the degree of national
consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular
punishment cruel and unusual.”322 Justice Scalia limited the societal values
investigation to legislation and sentences actually imposed, refusing to
consider public opinion polls or positions adopted by professional associations:
We decline . . . to rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations. A
revised national consensus so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify a
permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must appear in
the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have
323
approved.

Urging that the Court must not “replace judges of the law with a committee of
philosopher-kings,”324 he reiterated his opposition to judicial assessment of a
punishment’s acceptability:
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Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 868 n.4.
Id. at 873.
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[O]ur job is to identify the ‘evolving standards of decency’; to determine, not
what they should be, but what they are . . . . [W]e emphatically reject [the]
suggestion that the issues . . . permit us to apply ‘our own informed judgment’
. . . regarding the desirability of permitting the death penalty for crimes by 16325
and 17-year-olds.

The Court upheld the execution of persons who were mentally retarded in
Penry v. Lynaugh (1989),326 but reversed itself in Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
based on intervening changes in public attitudes and practices. 327 At the time
of Penry, two states prohibited execution of mentally retarded persons.328 Even
adding the fourteen non-death-penalty states, this did not show inconsistency
with evolving standards of decency.329 In Atkins, Justice Stevens’ opinion for
the Court observed that eighteen states barred the execution of the mentally
retarded, sixteen more than at the time of Penry.330 Since twelve states had no
death penalty, this meant thirty states did not sanction execution of the
mentally retarded.331 The opinion emphasized “the consistency of the direction
of change,”332 observing that no state that prohibited the execution of the
mentally retarded had removed the prohibition.333 The majority also noted
opposition to execution of the mentally retarded by a wide range of
professional and religious organizations, and polling data that indicated “a
widespread consensus among Americans . . . that executing the mentally
retarded is wrong.”334 Citing evidence that the challenged punishment was
“overwhelmingly disapproved” by the “world community,” the Court stated
that the consistency of international sources “lends further support to our
conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the
issue.”335 Finally, executing mentally retarded persons was excessive, due to
lessened personal culpability.336 The Court’s opinion in Atkins bore significant
similarities to its opinion in Lawrence. In both instances, the direction of recent
changes in state legislation was considered most relevant. A trend towards
observance could support a right’s emergence even amidst dissensus.
In dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia argued
that the prohibition of executing mentally retarded persons by eighteen states,
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less than half of the states with a death penalty, did not establish a national
consensus.337 The data did not show anything close to the consensus shown in
previous cases where the Court had invalidated punishments.338 Moreover,
many states with legislation prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded had
adopted the legislation recently, suggesting that public attitudes were fluid.339
The Atkins dissenters also continued their attack on the majority’s reliance on
societal values indicators beyond legislation and juries and on judicial
assessment of moral acceptability. In their view, the majority opinion “rested .
. . upon nothing but the personal views” of the Justices.340 Yet, since the
Justices lacked authority to impose their own feelings, only consideration of
actions by legislatures and juries could “be reconciled with the undeniable
precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual sentencing
juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to
the complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of
publicly acceptable criminal punishments.”341
Just as Atkins overturned a 13-year-old decision, Roper v. Simmons (2005)
overturned Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), holding, 5-4, that execution of persons
under eighteen violated the Clause.342 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
majority in Roper used the same framework as Atkins, and the figures on state
legislation were similar. By the time Roper was decided, 18 states barred
execution of juveniles.343 Since twelve states had no death penalty, thirty
altogether did not authorize execution of juveniles.344 Justice Kennedy viewed
this evidence as supporting a finding that societal standards were no longer
consistent with execution of minors.345 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Roper
also considered sentences in foreign countries. Only seven countries other than
the United States had executed minors since 1990, and all of them had
abolished or disavowed the practice.346 The United Kingdom, whose practice
was of special interest due to the “historic ties between our countries and in
light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins,” abolished death for juveniles
decades before abolishing the penalty altogether.347 A number of treaties

337. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322, 342–43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined each other’s opinions, and Justice Thomas
joined both opinions as well. Id. at 321, 337 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 343 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 344.
340. Id. at 338.
341. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
342. 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
343. Id. at 559–60.
344. Id. at 564.
345. Id. at 565–67.
346. Id. at 577.
347. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
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banned execution of minors, including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and the United States was one of only two countries that had not
ratified it.348 In short, “the United States now stands alone in a world that has
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”349 Although the “opinion of
the world community” was “not controlling,” it did provide instruction and
“respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”350 The
Court’s determination that death was disproportionate for minors found
“confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.”351 It did “not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those
same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”352 The majority’s
independent judgment also led to the conclusion that death was
disproportionate when imposed on juveniles.353 Capital punishment for minors
served neither deterrence nor retribution in light of the diminished culpability
of minors for their crimes, due in part to psychological differences between
juveniles and adults.354
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Clarence Thomas, argued that the count of states opposing execution of minors
should not include those with no capital punishment.355 The inquiry concerned
attitudes about executing minors, not capital punishment generally. Only 47%
of death penalty states prohibited execution of minors: “Words have no
meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a
national consensus.”356 Previous cases “required overwhelming opposition to a
challenged practice, generally over a long period of time.”357 Justice Scalia
renewed his argument against reliance on international sources. The majority’s
“basic premise . . . that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of
the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”358 At any rate, the Court was
inconsistent in the weight it accorded international practices. For example, the
rest of the world rejected strict application of the exclusionary rule, and the
United States was one of only six countries in the world that allowed abortion

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 575.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 571–72.
Id.
Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 609.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 624.
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on demand up to the point of viability.359 The majority, Justice Scalia charged,
used foreign law to set aside established principles of American law, not to
reinforce them.360 The fact that the United States had not endorsed treaty
provisions banning the execution of minors underscored the lack of an
American consensus against execution of juveniles.
Two competing frameworks, then, have emerged in the Court’s
jurisprudence on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. One has rejected
independent judicial assessment and has rested adjudication entirely on
particular arguments. The other has combined independent judicial assessment
according to universal standards with particular arguments. Justices backing
the role of universal arguments in the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence have been careful to say that the Court should engage in its own
normative assessment of a challenged punishment’s validity,361 suggesting that
this assessment is independent of contemporary societal values. But the Court
has not clarified adequately the relationship between the universal and nonuniversal elements of their opinions. For instance, what if the independent
normative assessment and the analysis of contemporary societal values point in
opposite directions?362 The question remains unanswered. The resulting
ambiguity jeopardizes the independence of the normative assessment,
especially in light of the Justices’ extensive debates over the proper way to
measure public attitudes. The prolonged discussions on how to count the
number of states approving of a punishment furthers the impression that shifts
in public attitudes are playing the primary role in interpretation.
D. Reliance on State Practices and Foreign Law
Confusion regarding the basis of rights interpretations is magnified by a
recent intensification in the Court’s attention to state practices as a basis for
rights interpretation. While citation of state practices is not new, scholars have
begun recognizing its increasing role.363 Indicators of legal policies as adopted
and applied by states include jury behavior, prosecutorial decisions, and,
especially, state legislation. Quantitative analysis of state practices as an

359. Id. at 624–25.
360. Id. at 628.
361. E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (stating that it was “for [the Court]
ultimately to judge” the punishment’s constitutionality).
362. See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1103–04
(2006) (noting that the Court has not clarified how it would resolve a conflict if different
interpretive methodologies in the same case pointed to different conclusions).
363. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57
UCLA L. REV. 365, 368–69 (2009) (noting the Court’s majoritarian approach to the Eighth
Amendment has been used in other arguments); Note, State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty
Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1671 (2007).
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interpretive tool is most familiar in Eighth Amendment cases,364 but it is
commonly used365 by Justices across the ideological spectrum366 in other areas
as well, including substantive and procedural due process,367 and the Fourth
and Sixth Amendments.368 The citation of state practices is not problematic in
itself. The Justices at times have used state practices in a manner that produces
no confusion regarding the basis of decision. For instance, state practices may
support empirical claims, such as that a given policy has proven infeasible in
implementation.369 Reliance on state practices, however, can be problematic
for either of two reasons. First, it is problematic if used in a manner suggesting
that shifts in the popularity of practices can swing the meaning of rights.370
Second, the citation of state practices alongside universal arguments without an
explanation of the interrelation produces uncertainty regarding the basis of
decision.371
Confusion in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the basis of rights also is
exacerbated by the Justices’ insufficiently explained references to foreign law.
Foreign citations are less frequent than reference to state practices (although
they have received greater attention from scholars)372 but common enough to
364. Krotoszynski, supra note 49, at 987.
365. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (2009).
366. Lain, supra note 363, at 409.
367. Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 741–42 (2008);
Hills, supra note 365, at 17; Krotoszynski, supra note 49, at 987; Lain, supra note 363, at 368–
69.
368. See Lain, supra note 363, at 395.
369. See id. at 384 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1985)).
370. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–11 (1997) (assisted suicide); BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (exemplary damages); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 651 (1961) (exclusionary rule); see Krotoszynski, supra note 49, at 1014–16 ; Lain, supra
note 363, at 374–77, 386–88 (explaining that legislative consensus is not conclusive but quite
persuasive).
371. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
570, 573 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–14 (2002); see Krotoszynski, supra note
49, at 952, 987 (contending state-counting results in an ad-hoc approach).
372. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 2, at 640; Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International
Sources in Constitutional Law, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 421 (2004); Rex D. Glensy,
Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority,
45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 360 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005); Joan Larsen, Importing
Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of
Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283,
1286–87 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 353 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 171 (2006); Michael D. Ramsey, International
Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 69,
69 (2004); Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the
Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1277
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merit attention, especially given their role in prominent cases373 and their
apparently increasing prevalence in Supreme Court opinions.374 Judges are
wise when considering empirical questions375 to glean insights from the
experiences of a variety of jurisdictions, both domestic and international.376
The question is whether foreign practices shape the bounds that constitutional
rights place around government actions.377 We can envision ways of
considering foreign law that would not amount to an expanded attitudinal
survey. The decisions of foreign adjudicative bodies might provide insightful
ways of thinking about rights. The Justices, however, generally do not engage
the reasoning behind the foreign practices.378 Foreign legal developments also
might point to an overwhelming consensus, which would be seen as evidence
that a right was indispensable to liberty. But the Justices have not articulated

(2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129,
132 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV.
148, 149 (2005).
373. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–76; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316
n.21.
374. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and The Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 753–55, 838–39, 907 (2005); Glensy, supra note 372, at 372.
Moreover, while citation of foreign sources is more common among Justices who view
themselves as liberal, it is not limited to Justices from only one end of the political spectrum.
Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 372, at 750–51; Krotoszynski, supra note 49, at 1020–21.
Scholarly interest in the subject has also increased of late. See Alford, supra note 2, at 641
(observing “a notable increase in scholarly literature on the subject of constitutional
comparativism”).
375. It is important to distinguish instances in which foreign practices are cited to support
empirical claims, regarding, for instance, the likely outcome of a given policy, from instances in
which they are cited to support legal arguments on non-constitutional issues. Young, supra note
372, at 150 (noting a distinction “between looking to foreign law to prove or disprove certain
factual propositions and looking abroad for normative guidance”).
376. See Bodansky, supra note 372, at 422 (linking reliance on foreign sources with the “[t]he
notion that we do not have a monopoly on wisdom and could learn from others”); Young, supra
note 372, at 151 (noting that it “seems positively anti-intellectual and hubristic to say that we can
learn nothing from foreign jurisdictions”).
377. See Larsen, supra note 372, at 1295 (noting that in recent opinions like Lawrence and
Atkins, the Court has looked to foreign sources not merely “to determine what effect would be
produced by adopting the foreign rule,” but “to determine what the content of the domestic
constitutional rule should be”).
378. Levinson, supra note 372, at 372 (noting that the Justices often cite foreign legal
developments sources without explaining the reasoning behind them); Larsen, supra note 372, at
1286 (noting that Justices Kennedy and Breyer often cite foreign legal developments sources
without explaining the reasoning behind them); Young, supra note 372, at 152 (stating that a
“lack of interest in the reasons underlying foreign practice is characteristic of the Court’s
employment of foreign law”).
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such an argument,379 and the judges often cite foreign law even when
considerable dissensus remains.380 If foreign citations are supposed to support
a particular argument, then we would expect to see an explanation of why
popular preferences outside the United States bear directly on the collective
decision-making authority of the American people. Indeed, while exclusive
particularists are wrong to rule out any place for universal reasoning, they are
right to suggest that only domestic popular preferences are relevant to
interpretation rooted in popular will.381 In the absence of an adequate
explanation of how foreign law fits into the analysis, the Justices’ citation of
foreign law is problematic, because it reinforces the impression that rights
interpretation is responsive to a tallying of public opinion, with the survey now
extended beyond American borders. Moreover, as with state practices, the
Justices have cited foreign law alongside universal arguments without
explaining the interrelation.
As noted, Justices in an earlier time more often made clear how the
investigation of prevalent practices served a subsidiary role within an
overarching universal argument.382 One approach was to examine practices in
jurisdictions dedicated to the same universal standards the Justices were
employing. That is, observing practices within free, republican societies could
be helpful in discerning the essential requirements of free, republican
government. The examination of practices sometimes extended beyond
American borders. Uniform observance of a practice might count as evidence
of its indispensability. Conversely, a lack of consensus might count as
evidence against the right’s indispensable nature. On this approach, the
overarching standard was unambiguously universal, and practices served as
evidence for or against a right’s universal status. The Justices sometimes
examined practices with an eye to the nature of the beliefs supporting them. In
these instances, the investigation focused on how often the right was observed
specifically because it was believed to enjoy universal status. The governing
standard was universal, and practices served as evidence bearing on the
standard’s meaning and application. By contrast, in prominent contemporary
decisions, like Atkins v. Virginia (2002), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and Roper
v. Simmons (2005), the Court has relied on recent shifts in public attitudes to
support new interpretations of rights on issues where considerable dissensus

379. See Tushnet, supra note 372, at 1301 (“[T]he actual practice that has generated
discussion of references to non-U.S. law makes only the tiniest gestures toward the idea that nonU.S. judgments can help identify universal norms.”).
380. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 n.21 (2002).
381. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
382. See supra Part II.
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remained.383 In such opinions, the investigation of practices was part of a
broader investigation into evolving societal attitudes. The inquiry kicked off
with data on recent trends in state legislation, and included additional sources,
such as opinions of professional associations, public opinion, and international
practices. This treatment of data suggested that attitudinal shifts directly altered
the meaning of rights.384
Confusion regarding the basis of decision is exacerbated when Justices cite
foreign and state practices in the same breath without explaining if, or how,
they serve the same argument. Scholarship typically treats citation of state and
foreign practices as separate topics. Yet the most important thing about them is
what they share: they both are part of a judicial methodology that appeals to
indicators of societal attitudes without explaining why rights should fluctuate
with attitudinal trends or whether such trends trump universal arguments.
CONCLUSION
Justices using universal arguments have defended them as representing an
exercise of the Justices’ independent judgment, essential to constitutional
rights operating as an independent check on majority power that is not tied to
errors of the past. That aim is undermined by the Justices’ equivocation, which
calls into question whether universal arguments are doing any work. The
recitation of universal standards provides no normative force to the argument if
analysis under those standards amounts to a reading of popular preferences.
And universal arguments are rendered superfluous if opinions suggest that a
non-universal line of reasoning alone would have been sufficient to reach the
same conclusion.
The Court’s jurisprudence as a whole is troubling if one accepts the
premise expressed by many members of the Court that the judiciary must
retain access to lines of reasoning about the meaning of rights that do not
reduce to a reading of mass preferences. One major approach on the Court
denounces judicial reliance on universal arguments altogether while another
defends their use but frequently combines them with particular arguments in
ways that undermine their independent normative force. Opinions that gesture
towards universal arguments without adequately following through undermine
them in an insidious way. The exclusively particular approach has the virtue of
clarity in seeking to eliminate universal arguments, thus openly engaging
discussion on their appropriateness. Hollow incantation of universal arguments
threatens to undermine them as a vital component of judicial reasoning without
acknowledgment. Thus, universal arguments are undermined not only by

383. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
384. Atkins (2002) overturned Penry (1989), Lawrence (2003) overturned Bowers (1986), and
Roper (2005) overturned Stanford (1989).
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outright opposition but also by the tentative and unclear manner in which they
are used.
Ambiguity regarding the basis of decision is troubling for a reason that
applies regardless of one’s views on the appropriateness of universal
arguments. Not only is the character of constitutional discourse at stake, but
also the people’s ability to shape that discourse. Whatever one thinks about its
appropriateness, the Justices have in fact appealed to universal standards in
numerous issue areas. The content of judicial opinions is significant not only
because it outlines the reasoning supporting the decision at hand, but also
because it facilitates engagement with that reasoning by other participants in
the legal system.This is especially important in a system that relies so heavily
on the participation of actors other than judges. While the judiciary as an
institution is not designed to be democratic in the same way as a legislature, it
does depend for its legitimacy on the ability of combatants in an adversarial
legal system to fully engage with judges over the justifications behind
decisions. The development of law through adjudication requires an iterative
discourse involving the input of parties and their counsel. The crafting of
arguments by advocates is informed by the kinds of reasoning that judges have
relied upon in previous cases. Universal reasoning, like all kinds of legal
reasoning, is developed best through an ongoing discourse that probes
weaknesses in positions and tests implications of principles. Participants
should be able to contribute to the debate either by further elaborating details
within the framework or by more precisely specifying the links in the chain of
reasoning with which they disagree. The development of a coherent body of
justificatory arguments, shaped significantly by parties other than judges, is
hampered if the Justices’ reasoning is not sufficiently clear to invite intellectual
engagement by other players. Ironically, concerns over the appearance of
illegitimacy may dissuade Justices from developing their universal arguments
with greater clarity, but the absence of clarity is the greater threat to
legitimacy. The confusion produced by the Justices’ failure to specify the
relationship between universal and non-universal bases of interpretation is
damaging for a system that depends on litigants’ participation in the process
through which constitutional rights are developed.

